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Abstract In 1972, Michael Baxandal characterizes the
processes responsible for the cultural relativism of art
experience as highly complex and unknown in their phys-
iological detail. While art history still shows considerable
interest in the brain sciences forty years later, most cross-
disciplinary studies today are referring to the neurosciences
in an attempt to seek scientific legitimization of variations
of a generalized and largely deterministic model of per-
ception, reducing interaction between a work of art and its
observers to a set of biological automatisms. I will chal-
lenge such an approach and take up art theory’s interest in
the historico-cultural and situational dimensions of art
experience. Looking at two examples of large-scale instal-
lation and sculptural post-war American art, I will explore
instable perceptions of depth and changing experiences of
space that indicate complex interactions between perceptual
and higher cognitive processes. The argument will draw on
recent theories describing neuronal processes underlying
multistable phenomena, eye movement, visual attention and
decision-making. As I will show a large number of neuro-
scientific studies provide theoretical models that help us
analyse not the anthropological constants but the influence
of cultural, individual and situational variables on aesthetic
experience.
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Introduction: Double Negative and Space Division
Constructions
Double Negative, constructed by artist Michael Heizer in
1969–1970 with bulldozers and dynamite, consists of a pair
of linear trenches at the edge of the plateau of Mormon
Mesa in Nevada, both approximately 9 m wide and 15 m
deep (Fig. 1). The two cuts line up across a large irregular
gap formed by the natural shape of the mesa edge. Visiting
this ‘negative sculpture’ in March 2012 as one of our last
stops on a study trip with colleagues and students that
took us through Utah and Nevada, the structure felt less
‘abstract’ than it appeared on aerial photographs and less
‘gigantic’ and ‘vast’ as conveyed by descriptions and
satellite images (Fig. 2). Nobody seemed ‘overwhelmed’ or
‘knocked out’ (Strelow 1970; Causey 1998) by its size, and
the ‘sublime’ was not a notion corresponding to our expe-
rience. The excavated space appeared modest in compari-
son with the enormous Kennecott Copper Mine visited
before. Not the ‘nature’ in view or prehistoric monuments
seemed the relevant reference points but passages cut for
the historic transcontinental railroad and for the highway.
Robert Smithson’s (1973) metaphoric use of the term of
‘entropy’, relating geological to political and economical
processes shaped the experience of the eroded earth and
rocks. Michael Heizer himself claims that his work has to
be experienced directly that it is not ‘conceptual’ and
without historical association (Heizer cit. in: Lippard 1983;
Brown1984; Felix 1979). Nevertheless, our visit to Double
Negative is exemplary for the complex interactions between
built form (or sensory input), bodily exploration, spatial
perception and a number of historico-cultural, individual
and situational variables such as memories of images
showing the work and individual knowledge of art history
and theory (compare Danto 1964).
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Closer to a controlled experimental set-up, James
Turrell’s Space Division Constructions (1976—present)
confront us with instable visual and bodily experiences of
space that indicate a direct influence of newly gained
information on perception. Uninformed observers typically
see a light projection on a wall where in fact is a window
to another space filled with diffuse monochrome light
(Fig. 3). Once they learn about the actual spatial situa-
tion—be it via verbal information or a visual discovery
made from a different viewpoint—or develop a suspicion,
the experience alternates between two- and a vague three-
dimensionality, pointing to an impact of the gained
knowledge. The subtle perceptual shifts seem to be a
product of an intention and ‘effort’ to perceive the hidden
room.
I will examine such interactions between higher cogni-
tion and perception characteristic for art and architecture
experience. Focusing on the question whether and to what
extent intentions and cognitive activities such as thoughts,
doubts, suspicions and assumptions might influence per-
ceptual experience and might be able to, if only to a certain
extent, ‘turn the switch’ between two or more alternative
visual interpretations, I will ask what the neurosciences
may contribute to our understanding, analysis and discus-
sion of the processes involved.
Art history and neuroscience
Michael Baxandal notes that the processes responsible for a
cultural relativism of art perception ‘do not work serially’
and are ‘indescribably complex and still obscure in [their]
physiological detail’ (1972:32). Forty years later, studies
linking art history and neuroscience are less devoted to
understanding such nonlinearities than to mapping aes-
thetic qualities to the brain regions involved (e.g. Kawabata
Fig. 1 Michael Heizer, Double Negative, 1969–1970, Photo: Nina Zschocke, 2012
Fig. 2 Michael Heizer, Double Negative, 1969–1970, satellite image
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and Zeki 2004; Tomohiro and Zeki 20111) or are intro-
ducing an environmental determinism to a history of cre-
ative expression and aesthetic experience (Onians 2010,
2007). Others examine ‘imitative bodily feels’ that mirror
abstract compositions and figural scenes seen in images.
Such imitative feels are said to occur also ‘in response to
experience of architectural forms, such as a twisted
romanesque column’ (Freedberg and Gallese 2007, p.197).
While this adds interesting observations to a discourse on
possible interrelations between visual, bodily and emo-
tional responses to art, the authors assume an immediate
and automatic relation between form (or visual stimulus)
and experience. I will not question that ‘imitative’ bodily
responses to visual stimuli are possible and frequently
experienced but challenge the determinism of the theory
presented as an explanation.
An alternative approach: behaviour, eye movement
and attention
If we take up art theory’s engagement with the historico-
cultural and situational dimensions of art and architecture
experience and search the brain sciences for useful models,
neuroscientific studies on eye movement and visual atten-
tion that describe ‘top-down’ influences of higher cognitive
processes on perception are of particular interest. While
‘attention’ stands for a selective enhancement of scene
aspects, eye movements such as ‘saccadic eye movements’
(used to rapidly look back and forth when examining a
picture or scene) decide which ‘stimuli’ reach the fovea.
Traditionally, movements have been divided into stimulus-
driven (predictable) ‘reflexes’ and goal-driven (unpredict-
able) voluntary ‘behaviour’. The concept of reflex
describes animals as ‘geared’ into the turning universe that
drives them (Sherrington 1906). Reflex-like eye move-
ments were defined as fully determined by the physical
properties of the visual input—that is, by neuronal maps
representing the ‘bottom-up’ salience of the stimuli.
However, it has been argued that ‘reflexes are a framework
for thinking about the connection between sensation and
action that is outdated and mechanically inadequate’ as ‘at
a physiological level there is no such thing as a reflex’
(Glimcher 2003a:xix). Consequently, even simple and not
consciously controlled behaviour such as saccadic deci-
sion-making is thought to be best described by models that
start off by defining a behavioural goal and that assume a
neuronal process that calculates the probability of positive
or negative consequences of a future behaviour (Glimcher
2003a, b; Platt and Glimcher 1999).
For perceptual attention, a distinction between stimulus-
driven ‘bottom-up’ and goal-directed ‘top-down’ attention
seems still valid—even though some authors suggest an
equivalence of mechanisms for saccadic programming and
(covert) spatial attention (Moore 2006). Over all, attentional
selection is thought to result from dynamic interactions
between multiple brain areas encoding both sensory
Fig. 3 James Turrell, Moab, 2001, division space construction, Photo: Florian Holzherr
1 Interestingly the authors assume a close relationship between the
concepts of ‘beauty’ and ‘reward’.
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salience and goal information. It has been pointed out that
while bottom-up salience alone would make an observer
‘the slave of the stimulus’, top-down, user-driven control
allows us ‘to modify [our] impression of an image without
changing the stimulus itself’ (Wolfe 2006:984). Directing
perceptual attention away from an element or feature is an
effective means of decreasing responses to and awareness
of it—even in the case of highly salient pop-out stimuli
(Ipata et al. 2006). Furthermore, attention mechanisms can
lead to selective processing of task-relevant individual
features (e.g. ‘red’) and feature dimensions (e.g. ‘colour’) of
an object and to the suppression of the irrelevant features of
the same object. To process and perceive objects as wholes
is therefore ‘perhaps highly natural, but not mandatory’
(Fanini et al. 2006:586). On the other hand, some argue that
spatial attention facilitates object recognition and that it
is—under certain circumstances—needed to bind features
and elements to one coherent object representation and to
identify a visual object (VanRullen 2005). Results of studies
using degraded, impoverished or hidden images of objects
as stimuli indicate that a verbal ‘cue’ that informs about the
expected object category facilitates and speeds up object
detection and recognition (Eger et al. 2007). Other publi-
cations describe the effects and mechanisms of top-down
auditory, tactile and intermodal attention. Again, it is
argued that short- and long-term goals have a strong impact
onto the selection of a relevant sensory stream (Burton et al.
1999; Salmi et al. 2009; Kanayama et al. 2012) and that top-
down attention facilitates integration (Talsma et al. 2010).
Emotion signals provide yet another source of biases on
perceptual processing (‘emotional attention’) thought to
involve a balance between bottom-up and top-down pro-
cesses (Pourtois et al. 2012).
In most experiments, behavioural ‘goals’ are defined and
controlled by ‘tasks’ and verbal or pictorial ‘cues’.
Accordingly, we may analyse previous experiences, con-
textual information, knowledge and implicit instructions by
artists, curators or authors as potential ‘cues’ and ‘tasks’,
having an impact on the perceptual experience of a work of
art or architecture. We are required to ask how specific
arguments (including one’s own) redefine or influence the
‘goals’ an observer is pursuing in his perceptual behaviour
when confronted with a work of art or architecture. It could
be argued, for example, that verbal information about a
hidden space in Turrell’s Space Division Constructions
enhances the awareness of minimal spatial indicators (or of a
lack of surface structure) and thereby destabilizes a previous
visual interpretation. The instability of perceived depth and
materiality would then reflect not (only) formal qualities of
the installation but changing hypotheses and motivations.
Likewise, the cited neuroscientific arguments require us to
ask which higher cognitive processes are triggered by
Heizer’s Double Negative itself, by a previously visited site,
a discussion with colleagues, by a remembered text or
photograph—and what could be the effect of their feedback
into perceptual processing and, ultimately, for a visual and
bodily experience of scale. Returning to photographs of
Double Negative with Freedberg and Gallese’s theory of
‘imitative bodily feels’ in mind, I am in fact able to expe-
rience embodied empathy with the damaged mountain sur-
face. However, I’d argue that such imitative bodily
responses are not automatic but dependent on factors such as
my willingness to re-enact the authors’ experiences. They
involve processes of overlooking (directing attention away
from) visual indicators of the picture’s materiality that
interferes with an immersive experience of depicted action
or space. Models of top-down control of haptic and cross-
modal attention may furthermore serve to describe an
enhancement of specific bodily experiences.
Conclusion
Today’s neuroscience provides us with theories that indeed
describe neuronal processes that are ‘highly complex’ as
Michael Baxandall suspected. The cited arguments may
serve us as new theoretic precision tools. Instead of
assuming reflex-like responses to sensory input and
reducing aesthetic experience to simple mechanisms, they
give weight to the individual and situational modulation of
environmental and historico-cultural factors neglected by
recent cross-disciplinary studies and only insufficiently
conceptualized by earlier ones (e.g. Arnheim 1954;
Gombrich 1960).
The insistence on the individual’s capacity to oppose
seemingly automatic effects of environmental factors that
act upon him or her gives my argument a political twist.
Potential behavioral ‘goals’ are not limited to receiving the
largest amount of immediate primary ‘reward’ available but
include ‘all other factors that motivate performance, such as
preference for a novel location or stimulus, the satisfaction
of performing well or the desire to complete a day’s work’
(Maunsell 2004). We might add to the list such motivations
as resistance, emancipation from tasks assigned by an
authority (a scientist, artist, curator or critic) or an interest in
finding proof for or against a certain claim. While ‘propa-
ganda’ tries to ‘hard wire’ desired responses, a number of
artists are interested in exposing, undermining and decon-
structing the quasi-automatic processes involved. It is
important to note that the ‘lessons’ learned in our individual
past as well as social exchange is thought by a number of
neuroscientists to possess the power to liberate the indi-
vidual from reflex-like reactions.
Finally, I’d like to emphasize that the act of refering to
individual theories offered by a different discipline—and
by one as dynamic and full of controversies as the
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neurosciences in particular—is highly selective. Presenting
primarily arguments in favour of top-down control of
perceptual experience has to be tagged as an expression of
my interests and convictions. It is an act of taking up a
position not only within my own discipline, art history, but
also in relation to debates in neuroscience.
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